skills/hhu3637kr/skills/agent-browser/Gen Agent Trust Hub

agent-browser

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 3, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation instructs users to install the 'agent-browser' package globally via npm and to download Chromium binaries. These resources are hosted by or associated with Vercel Labs, which is a trusted organization.\n
  • Evidence: npm install -g agent-browser and agent-browser install mentioned in SKILL.md.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a Python script for environment verification and instructions for system-level adjustments using elevated privileges.\n
  • Evidence: scripts/check_environment.py uses subprocess.run to execute version checks for Node.js, npm, and the agent-browser CLI.\n
  • Evidence: The troubleshooting guide in references/troubleshooting.md suggests using sudo to install Playwright system dependencies and chmod to modify permissions.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it facilitates the ingestion of untrusted data from the web into the agent's context.\n
  • Ingestion points: The snapshot, get text, and get html commands in SKILL.md and references/commands.md allow the agent to read content from arbitrary URLs.\n
  • Boundary markers: The documentation does not provide specific instructions for using delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded in the fetched web content.\n
  • Capability inventory: The agent is granted high-impact capabilities including navigation, form submission (fill, click), and file uploads (upload).\n
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation performed on the web content before it is passed to the AI agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 3, 2026, 07:21 AM