browser-automation

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill's primary mechanism is mcp__playwright__browser_run_code, which executes arbitrary JavaScript within the browser. This capability allows the agent to perform any action on a webpage, including complex interactions and data exfiltration, as demonstrated in SKILL.md and references/examples.md.
  • CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE (MEDIUM): The interactive-flow.md documentation describes a pattern where the agent collects user credentials (emails, passwords) via AskUserQuestion and then passes them as plain text within a Task prompt or interpolates them into JavaScript code. This places sensitive secrets directly into the agent's context and history.
  • EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (LOW): The README.md instructs users to install @anthropic-ai/mcp-playwright via npx. While the source is a trusted organization, the use of npx to fetch and run remote packages at runtime introduces standard supply-chain risks.
  • PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): This skill is highly susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: Any website navigated to via the Playwright tools (e.g., browser_navigate, browser_run_code).
  • Boundary markers: The prompt templates in SKILL.md lack delimiters or specific instructions to ignore embedded commands in the web content.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has full JavaScript execution (browser_run_code), subagent creation (Task), and user interaction (AskUserQuestion) capabilities.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the HTML/content being processed from external sites.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:47 PM