cross-model-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of external CLI binaries, specifically
claudeandcodex, to perform its core functions. It uses these tools to run code reviews, execute prompts, and perform file system operations. Evidence: SKILL.md contains numerous examples of shell commands such ascodex review,claude -p, andgit diff | claude. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data (the code being reviewed) and passes it to an AI model with active tool permissions. Malicious instructions embedded in the codebase could potentially influence the reviewer model's behavior. Evidence: (1) Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via
git diffand file reading tools in SKILL.md. (2) Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded prompts are provided in the command templates. (3) Capability inventory: TheclaudeCLI is explicitly grantedRead,Glob,Grep, andBash(git *)permissions in SKILL.md. (4) Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the diff content is performed before interpolation into the model's prompt.
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