orchestrator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several CLI tools to interact with the environment and external services.
- Evidence: Executes GitHub CLI commands (
gh issue view,gh pr view,gh pr list,gh pr create) to manage repository data (SKILL.md, Sections 3.1, 5.2, 5.3). - Evidence: Uses custom tools
codex execfor task execution andmkoutputfor file generation (SKILL.md, Sections 2.2, 3.2). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and acting upon untrusted data from external platforms.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through
gh issue view,gh pr view, and Jira API calls, as well as reading local files viamemo <path>(SKILL.md, Section 3.1). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands when the fetched content is passed to subagents or planning phases.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to write files (
mkoutput), execute tasks (codex exec), and create pull requests (gh pr create). - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering logic is present to ensure that fetched issue or PR descriptions do not contain malicious instructions that could manipulate the agent's workflow.
Audit Metadata