subagent-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill automates context collection by executing several local command-line tools, including
gitfor branch diffing and the GitHub CLI (gh) for fetching pull request and issue metadata. These operations are used to build the context provided to reviewers. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface. It ingests untrusted data from
git diffoutputs and GitHub metadata (PR/Issue bodies and comments) and interpolates this content directly into the prompts for sub-agents (e.g.,reviewer-security,reviewer-code). An attacker could embed malicious instructions in code comments or PR descriptions to influence the behavior of the sub-agents. 1. Ingestion points: Data enters viagit diffandghCLI commands inSKILL.md. 2. Boundary markers: The skill uses markdown comment markers (e.g.,<!-- REVIEW_SESSION -->) and sub-agent capability tags, but these do not prevent the LLM from obeying instructions embedded in the ingested data. 3. Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands, perform file system operations viamkoutput, and launch multiple parallel sub-tasks. 4. Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping applied to the untrusted content before it is processed. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Utilizes the
codex exectool to run review tasks in a managed environment, supporting both sequential execution and background process management.
Audit Metadata