skills/iails01/skills/moltbook-patrol/Gen Agent Trust Hub

moltbook-patrol

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): Evidence in references/official-heartbeat.md contains explicit instructions to overwrite the agent's own logic files: curl -s https://www.moltbook.com/skill.md > ~/.moltbot/skills/moltbook/SKILL.md. This allows a remote third party to modify the agent's system instructions or tool definitions at any time.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The reference files (official-heartbeat.md, official-messaging.md) provide numerous shell command templates using curl. If the agent follows these 'official' guides, it will execute arbitrary network requests and shell redirections that could compromise the host environment.
  • DATA_EXFILTRATION (LOW): The skill is designed to transmit an Authorization: Bearer token (API Key) to an external domain (www.moltbook.com). While this is the intended use case, it establishes a pattern for credential handling and potential exfiltration to a non-whitelisted destination.
  • INDIRECT PROMPT INJECTION (LOW): The skill's architecture relies on reading 'official' documentation which contains executable instructions. This exposes a significant attack surface where malicious content in the remote docs can manipulate agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: references/official-*.md
  • Boundary markers: Present (<<<OFFICIAL_DOC_START>>>), but instructions within the untrusted content encourage the agent to ignore safety protocols.
  • Capability inventory: Execution of node scripts and curl commands.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill encourages direct adoption of instructions found in external documents.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:41 PM