dev-browser
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 25, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary operational mode involves the agent writing and executing arbitrary TypeScript/JavaScript code locally via
npx tsxand shell commands (documented inSKILL.mdand implemented inserver.sh). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/start-server.tsscript automatically executesnpm installandplaywright install chromiumto fetch external binaries and libraries. Additionally,SKILL.mddirects users to download a browser extension from an untrusted GitHub repository (SawyerHood/dev-browser). - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The 'Extension Mode' described in
SKILL.mdand implemented insrc/relay.tsgrants the agent control over the user's actual browser session, providing access to cookies, saved passwords, and authenticated web applications. This presents a significant risk of sensitive data exposure if the agent is coerced into navigating to malicious sites or replaying API requests to attacker-controlled servers. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. The
getAISnapshotfunction insrc/client.tsand the associated injection logic insrc/snapshot/browser-script.tsread and process the full accessibility tree of any website the agent visits. Malicious instructions embedded in a webpage's HTML or metadata could be interpreted as commands by the agent. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The system uses
eval()insidepage.evaluate()withinsrc/client.tsandsrc/snapshot/__tests__/snapshot.test.tsto execute bundled snapshot logic. The entire workflow relies on the runtime generation and execution of scripts (Category 10).
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata