skills/iannuttall/ralph/dev-browser/Gen Agent Trust Hub

dev-browser

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 25, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary operational mode involves the agent writing and executing arbitrary TypeScript/JavaScript code locally via npx tsx and shell commands (documented in SKILL.md and implemented in server.sh).
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The scripts/start-server.ts script automatically executes npm install and playwright install chromium to fetch external binaries and libraries. Additionally, SKILL.md directs users to download a browser extension from an untrusted GitHub repository (SawyerHood/dev-browser).
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The 'Extension Mode' described in SKILL.md and implemented in src/relay.ts grants the agent control over the user's actual browser session, providing access to cookies, saved passwords, and authenticated web applications. This presents a significant risk of sensitive data exposure if the agent is coerced into navigating to malicious sites or replaying API requests to attacker-controlled servers.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. The getAISnapshot function in src/client.ts and the associated injection logic in src/snapshot/browser-script.ts read and process the full accessibility tree of any website the agent visits. Malicious instructions embedded in a webpage's HTML or metadata could be interpreted as commands by the agent.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The system uses eval() inside page.evaluate() within src/client.ts and src/snapshot/__tests__/snapshot.test.ts to execute bundled snapshot logic. The entire workflow relies on the runtime generation and execution of scripts (Category 10).
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 25, 2026, 06:52 PM