skills/inf-sh/skills/agent-tools/Gen Agent Trust Hub

agent-tools

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 18, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • Remote Code Execution (HIGH): The skill instructs the agent to install its CLI tool using curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh. This 'curl pipe bash' pattern allows for arbitrary code execution from a non-trusted external source.
  • Evidence: Found in SKILL.md, references/authentication.md, and references/cli-reference.md.
  • Source: https://cli.inference.sh is not a trusted domain per [TRUST-SCOPE-RULE].
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The skill serves as an interface for over 150 external AI apps (FLUX, Claude, Gemini, etc.), which represents a massive ingestion surface for untrusted data.
  • Ingestion points: Output from any of the 150+ supported apps (JSON/text) in references/running-apps.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the agent is expected to parse and use the output of these tools directly.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has permission to run infsh commands which can generate, search, and post to external platforms (e.g., Twitter).
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill lacks mechanisms to sanitize or validate the content returned from external model providers before the agent processes it.
  • Command Execution & Privilege Escalation (MEDIUM): The CLI reference suggests modifying system-wide shell completions which requires elevated permissions or environmental modification.
  • Evidence: infsh completion bash > /etc/bash_completion.d/infsh in references/cli-reference.md.
  • Credential Handling (SAFE): While the skill mentions the use of INFSH_API_KEY, it provides standard placeholders rather than hardcoded secrets.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 18, 2026, 03:40 PM