agent-browser
Fail
Audited by Snyk on Feb 18, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis
HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
- Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 0.90). The prompt's examples and API require supplying raw "text" fields (e.g., password, proxy_password) inline in CLI/JSON commands, which would force an LLM to embed secret values verbatim in generated commands/requests, creating exfiltration risk.
CRITICAL E005: Suspicious download URL detected in skill instructions.
- Suspicious download URL detected (high risk: 0.70). The set includes a direct-install shell script (curl https://cli.inference.sh | sh) and self-hosted binary distribution URLs (dist.inference.sh, cli.inference.sh, cloud.inference.sh) which are common malware distribution vectors unless the publisher is verified and checksums/signatures are independently validated, while the remaining links (google/example/proxy) are benign or neutral.
MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
- Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill's open/goto functions accept arbitrary URLs and its templates and functions (e.g., capture-workflow.sh, snapshot/execute returning elements_text and document.body.innerText, and the "open" examples) fetch and extract page text/links/screenshots from public websites, so the agent will read untrusted third‑party web content.
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