ai-content-pipeline
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 19, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill explicitly includes the command
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh. This 'pipe to shell' pattern from an untrusted source allows a remote server to execute arbitrary code on the host system without prior review. - EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (HIGH): The skill recommends adding multiple third-party skills using
npx skills add inference-sh/skills@.... These sources are not within the defined trusted repositories or organizations, increasing the risk of supply chain attacks. - COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The frontmatter requests
Bash(infsh *)permissions, granting the agent broad authority to execute any sub-command provided by theinfshtool. - INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The content pipeline design moves data between various AI models without sanitization, creating an attack surface for instructions embedded in one model's output to influence subsequent steps.
- Ingestion points: JSON output files like
script.jsonandvoice.jsonmentioned inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None are used to separate model-generated content from tool instructions.
- Capability inventory: Extensive use of the
infshCLI via Bash. - Sanitization: No input validation or escaping logic is described in the workflow examples.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata