linkedin-content
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 19, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill contains instructions to execute a remote script directly in the shell using
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh. This pattern is extremely dangerous as it grants the remote server full control over the local environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (HIGH): The skill relies on software from
inference.sh, which is not among the defined trusted organizations or repositories. This introduces supply-chain risk. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill is configured with
allowed-tools: Bash(infsh *), meaning the agent is explicitly authorized to execute the binary installed via the untrusted remote script. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill uses external tools like
tavily/search-assistantto fetch web content. - Ingestion points:
infsh app run tavily/search-assistantin SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent in the example commands.
- Capability inventory: Access to the
infshCLI tool and network operations via apps. - Sanitization: None detected for the data returned from searches before it is likely used for post generation.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata