AGENT LAB: SKILLS

press-release-writing

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 19, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (CRITICAL): The skill documentation includes a command to download and execute a script directly from https://cli.inference.sh using curl -fsSL ... | sh. This is a high-risk pattern that executes remote code with the user's local privileges without any integrity verification.
  • EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (HIGH): The skill promotes installing additional dependencies using npx skills add from the inference-sh organization. As this organization is not on the trusted sources list, these downloads are considered unverified and potentially malicious.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill is configured with allowed-tools: Bash(infsh *), which permits the execution of any subcommand under the infsh umbrella. This provides a significant attack surface for local command execution via the agent.
  • PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill's workflow involves ingesting untrusted data from external search providers (Tavily, Exa).
  • Ingestion points: Research data is pulled into the agent context via infsh app run commands.
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt templates to distinguish between instructions and search data.
  • Capability inventory: Full bash access via infsh and the ability to write files (implied by press release output).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization logic is present to filter malicious instructions embedded in search results.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Feb 19, 2026, 03:41 AM