NYC

agent-tools

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 18, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (CRITICAL): The skill configuration and documentation (SKILL.md, references/authentication.md) promote installation via curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh. This pattern is a verified remote code execution vulnerability when used with untrusted domains, as it allows a remote server to execute arbitrary code on the user's machine.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill defines allowed-tools: Bash(infsh *) in SKILL.md. This grants the AI agent broad authority to execute any subcommand of the infsh CLI, including those that manage cloud deployments, handle authentication (infsh login), and modify system configurations.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (HIGH): The skill depends on binaries and scripts from dist.inference.sh and external skill sets added via npx skills add. These sources are not within the trusted scope defined for AI agent skills, posing a significant supply chain integrity risk.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8). It ingests untrusted data via the --input flag in the infsh app run tool (documented in SKILL.md and references/running-apps.md). No boundary markers or sanitization procedures are documented to prevent embedded instructions in input data from hijacking the agent's logic.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Feb 18, 2026, 10:12 AM