NYC

prompt-engineering

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 18, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (CRITICAL): The skill instructs the user to execute a remote script via a pipe to a shell, which is an extremely dangerous pattern.
  • Evidence: curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh found in SKILL.md.
  • Risk: This executes arbitrary code from a non-trusted domain (inference.sh) with the user's current privileges, allowing for potential malware installation or data theft.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (HIGH): The skill promotes the installation of additional unverified components from untrusted sources.
  • Evidence: Multiple instances of npx skills add inference-sh/skills@... in the Related Skills section.
  • Risk: Encourages expanding the attack surface by downloading and running more third-party code without integrity verification.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill relies on executing a third-party CLI tool with complex, user-generated inputs.
  • Evidence: Extensive use of the infsh tool to process JSON payloads containing prompts and code.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill demonstrates patterns that are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection when processing external data.
  • Ingestion points: The --input JSON payload in infsh app run commands (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; raw strings are used within JSON structures.
  • Capability inventory: Shell access (via the infsh utility).
  • Sanitization: Absent; the examples show direct interpolation of potentially untrusted code snippets into LLM prompts.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Feb 18, 2026, 11:02 PM