agent-tools
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's installation instructions in
SKILL.mdandreferences/authentication.mddirect the user to executecurl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh. This pattern downloads and executes a script from a remote server directly in the user's shell, which is a significant security risk if the remote source is compromised.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requests permission forBash(infsh *), which grants the agent broad access to the vendor's CLI tool. This tool has capabilities for network operations, local file writes (via--saveflags), and configuration management.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Documentation inreferences/cli-reference.mdincludes commands to write shell completion scripts to protected system directories like/etc/bash_completion.d/. This activity typically requires elevated privileges and modifies system-wide configuration files.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the use of external LLMs and search tools (e.g.,infsh app run openrouter/claude-sonnet-45). This introduces a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions in processed data could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.md,references/running-apps.md(via--inputparameter ininfsh app run). - Boundary markers: None present in prompt templates.
- Capability inventory: The
infshCLI enables network communication, file system interaction, and automation of third-party platforms like Twitter. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input prompt is described in the skill documentation.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata