agent-browser
Fail
Audited by Snyk on Feb 25, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis
HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
- Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 0.90). The prompt's examples and API require supplying raw "text" fields (e.g., password, proxy_password) inline in CLI/JSON commands, which would force an LLM to embed secret values verbatim in generated commands/requests, creating exfiltration risk.
CRITICAL E005: Suspicious download URL detected in skill instructions.
- Suspicious download URL detected (high risk: 0.70). Most links are documentation and harmless assets, but the skill explicitly instructs running a remote installer (curl https://cli.inference.sh | sh) and downloading binaries from a non-major domain (dist.inference.sh) — a common malware distribution pattern; the presence of checksums reduces but does not eliminate risk unless they are independently verified/signed.
MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
- Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill explicitly navigates to arbitrary URLs and scrapes page content (via open/snapshot/execute in SKILL.md and references/commands.md) and the provided templates (templates/capture-workflow.sh, templates/form-automation.sh) extract elements_text and document.body.innerText from public websites, which the agent is expected to read and act on—exposing it to untrusted third-party content that could inject instructions.
Audit Metadata