ai-image-generation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation includes an installation command that fetches a shell script from the vendor's domain and pipes it to the shell.
- Evidence:
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh - Context: This is the official installation method for the
inference-sh-9vendor's CLI. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation script targets vendor-controlled infrastructure to download binary executables.
- Evidence: Fetches binaries from
dist.inference.shbased on OS and architecture. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires permission to execute the vendor's binary via the Bash tool.
- Evidence:
allowed-tools: Bash(infsh *)permits execution of all CLI commands needed for image generation and authentication. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user-provided text prompts to pass to remote AI models, which is the primary surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: User prompts are embedded in the
--inputJSON string for various model runs (e.g.,falai/flux-dev-lora). - Boundary markers: None present in the command templates to delimit user input from instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has permission to execute the
infshbinary and perform network requests through the vendor's API. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the prompt content is performed locally before being sent to the remote model.
Audit Metadata