ai-rag-pipeline
Fail
Audited by Snyk on Feb 25, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis
CRITICAL E005: Suspicious download URL detected in skill instructions.
- Suspicious download URL detected (high risk: 0.80). The URLs are concentrated on a single, relatively unknown domain (inference.sh) that provides a CLI via a curl | sh installer and direct binary distribution from a dist subdomain — piping a remote shell script and downloading executables from an untrusted/unknown host is potentially high-risk even though checksums and documentation partially mitigate the risk.
MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
- Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). The SKILL.md explicitly shows fetching and ingesting untrusted public web content (e.g., using tavily/search-assistant, exa/search and tavily/extract in the "Basic RAG Pipeline", "Multi-Source Research" and "URL Content Analysis" examples, including extracting from arbitrary URLs like "https://example.com/research-paper"), which are then injected into LLM prompts and can materially influence agent behavior.
MEDIUM W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
- Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The Quick Start includes a direct remote install-and-execute command (curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh) which fetches and runs code at install/runtime and the skill repeatedly relies on the resulting infsh CLI, so https://cli.inference.sh is a runtime external dependency that executes remote code.
Audit Metadata