prompt-engineering

The document is a benign prompt-engineering guide but it instructs a high-risk install and usage pattern: a pipe-to-shell installer that downloads a binary from a custom distribution host and a CLI that forwards arbitrary prompts and potentially stored credentials to external model providers. The primary risks are supply-chain compromise (remote code execution via installer or malicious binary updates), credential and data exfiltration through the CLI/gateway, and user data leaks from embedding secrets into prompts. There is no direct evidence in this text of obfuscated or malicious code, but the distribution and runtime flows raise medium-high security concern. Recommendations: do not run curl|sh installers without auditing the script; prefer OS package managers or cryptographically-signed releases verified out-of-band; inspect installer scripts; avoid embedding secrets into prompts; review how infsh stores credentials and network endpoints; and consider running the CLI in a minimal-privilege, sandboxed environment or using direct provider CLIs when possible.