agent-tools
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 24, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the user and agent to install the
inference.shCLI by piping a remote script directly to the shell (curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh). This is a highly insecure practice as it executes unverified code from an external source. A similar pattern is found in the manual installation instructions which dynamically fetch and execute a binary URL from a manifest file. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
infshCLI tool includes an 'automatic file upload' feature. When a local file path is provided in the JSON input for any AI app command (e.g.,infsh app run ... --input '{"image": "/path/to/file"}'), the CLI tool automatically reads that local file and uploads it to the vendor's cloud servers. This behavior creates a significant exfiltration vector; an attacker could use indirect prompt injection to trick the agent into uploading sensitive files like~/.ssh/id_rsa,.envfiles, or cloud credentials. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is configured with broad shell execution permissions for the
infshcommand via theBash(infsh *)tool definition. This allows the agent to execute any subcommand of the CLI, which includes deploying new apps, managing authentication, and interacting with the local filesystem. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation process involves downloading binaries and manifest files from
dist.inference.sh. These downloads are not from a well-known or trusted registry, and while the skill mentions checksum verification, the initial script that performs the verification is itself unverified. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a gateway to over 250 external AI apps and models (including Claude, Gemini, and search engines).
- Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context through the output of commands like
infsh app run,infsh task get, andinfsh app list(SKILL.md, references/running-apps.md). - Boundary markers: The skill does not define or use any delimiters or protective 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when presenting external app outputs to the agent.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (
infsh), read and upload local files (infsh app run), and manage cloud deployments (infsh app deploy). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of escaping, validation, or filtering of the content returned by the AI apps before it is processed by the primary agent.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata