infsh-cli
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to install the
beltCLI using a 'curl piped to shell' pattern (curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh). This method executes remote scripts directly and is an insecure installation practice, though the skill provides manual verification steps as an alternative.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: ThebeltCLI features automatic local file uploads when a file path is provided in the input JSON for an app run (e.g.,belt app run ... --input '{"image": "/path/to/photo.jpg"}'). This functionality could be exploited to exfiltrate sensitive files like SSH keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa) or environment variables (.env) if the agent is tricked into using those paths.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of thebeltbinary via the shell to interact with the platform, providing a direct interface for the agent to perform network and file system operations.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted inputs which are then used to trigger file reading and network transmissions.\n - Ingestion points: JSON input parameters for the
belt app runcommand.\n - Boundary markers: None identified in the instructions or reference files.\n
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution, file reading, and remote data uploading.\n
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation for file paths or JSON content provided to the CLI.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata