ai-automation-workflows
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits several indirect prompt injection surfaces where external or untrusted data is interpolated directly into LLM prompts.
- Ingestion points: In
data_processing.sh, local file contents are read viacat $file. Incontent_pipeline.sh, search results from an external assistant are stored in$RESEARCH. Inconditional_workflow.sh, user-provided$INPUT_TEXTis used. - Boundary markers: No delimiters (like XML tags or markdown blocks) or 'ignore' instructions are present to separate the data from the system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
belt app runto call various AI models and services, andsubprocess.runin Python to execute system commands. - Sanitization: No input validation or sanitization is performed on the ingested data before prompt interpolation.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references external installation scripts and additional skills hosted on the
inference-shGitHub organization. - Evidence: References to
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.mdfor CLI installation and severalnpx skills addcommands for related functionality. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is primarily composed of shell scripts (Bash) and Python scripts that execute the
beltCLI tool to perform AI operations, which is the intended purpose of the automation workflow templates.
Audit Metadata