ai-video-generation
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (CRITICAL): The skill documentation explicitly recommends the command
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh. This pattern downloads and executes a script from an untrusted external domain directly in the user's shell environment, allowing for full system compromise if the script is malicious. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill is highly vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8). It ingests untrusted data (prompts, URLs) and has significant execution capabilities.
- Ingestion points: The skill takes input through
prompt,image_url, andaudio_urlfields in JSON payloads passed to the CLI. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or delimiters are defined to separate instruction from data.
- Capability inventory: The skill is granted
Bash(infsh *)permissions, allowing it to execute arbitrary subcommands of theinfshtool, including login and running 40+ different remote models. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input sanitization or validation before passing user-controlled strings into the bash environment.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The
allowed-toolsconfiguration uses a wildcardBash(infsh *). This gives the agent permission to perform any action supported by theinfshbinary, including credential management (infsh login) and listing/running arbitrary external applications, which exceeds the principle of least privilege. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (LOW): The skill initiates downloads of external media (images, audio) via URLs provided in the input, which are then processed by external AI models on the
inference.shplatform.
Recommendations
- CRITICAL: Downloads and executes remote code from untrusted source(s): https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata