ai-video-generation

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (CRITICAL): The skill documentation explicitly recommends the command curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh. This pattern downloads and executes a script from an untrusted external domain directly in the user's shell environment, allowing for full system compromise if the script is malicious.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill is highly vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8). It ingests untrusted data (prompts, URLs) and has significant execution capabilities.
  • Ingestion points: The skill takes input through prompt, image_url, and audio_url fields in JSON payloads passed to the CLI.
  • Boundary markers: No boundary markers or delimiters are defined to separate instruction from data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is granted Bash(infsh *) permissions, allowing it to execute arbitrary subcommands of the infsh tool, including login and running 40+ different remote models.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input sanitization or validation before passing user-controlled strings into the bash environment.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The allowed-tools configuration uses a wildcard Bash(infsh *). This gives the agent permission to perform any action supported by the infsh binary, including credential management (infsh login) and listing/running arbitrary external applications, which exceeds the principle of least privilege.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (LOW): The skill initiates downloads of external media (images, audio) via URLs provided in the input, which are then processed by external AI models on the inference.sh platform.
Recommendations
  • CRITICAL: Downloads and executes remote code from untrusted source(s): https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 08:26 AM