twitter-automation

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • Remote Code Execution (CRITICAL): The skill instructs users to run curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh. This is a classic RCE vector that executes a remote script with local privileges. The domain inference.sh is not a trusted source, making this extremely dangerous.
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH):
  • Ingestion points: Processes output from external AI services (falai, Google) and user-provided JSON files (e.g., input.json) to generate social media content.
  • Boundary markers: None. Data is interpolated directly into command arguments.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive write capabilities, including posting tweets, sending direct messages (DMs), following users, and deleting content.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering. Malicious instructions embedded in external AI outputs or user data could trick the agent into performing unauthorized account actions.
  • External Downloads (HIGH): The skill promotes the installation of further unverified extensions via npx skills add inferencesh/skills, expanding the attack surface through untrusted third-party code.
  • Command Execution (MEDIUM): The YAML frontmatter grants broad execution rights to the infsh utility via allowed-tools: Bash(infsh *), which is the primary interface for all sensitive operations.
Recommendations
  • CRITICAL: Downloads and executes remote code from untrusted source(s): https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 06:09 AM