pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands to interact with the local git repository and GitHub via the
ghCLI. - Evidence: Uses
git push -u origin <branch>to push code to the remote repository. - Evidence: Uses
gh pr createandgh pr editto create or update pull request metadata and descriptions. - Evidence: Executes
gh pr diff,gh pr view, andgit diffto gather context from the environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface because it synthesizes descriptions based on untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads content from local repository files, specifically
SPEC.md, changed source code files, and existing pull request descriptions fetched viagh pr view. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are used when processing the contents of the spec or code diffs.
- Capability inventory: The skill can push code to remote branches and modify GitHub PR content, which could be abused if the agent is manipulated by instructions hidden in the code or documentation it reads.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the content retrieved from the repository before it is used to generate the PR narrative.
Audit Metadata