skill-creator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes external CLI tools to perform its tasks.
scripts/run_eval.pyandscripts/run_loop.pyexecute theclaudeCLI tool usingsubprocess.Popento test skill triggering behavior.eval-viewer/generate_review.pyexecuteslsofviasubprocess.runto identify and manage local network ports.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The web-based evaluation viewer fetches external resources at runtime.
eval-viewer/viewer.htmlloads theSheetJSlibrary from a public CDN (cdn.sheetjs.com) to render spreadsheet outputs within the browser.- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Local skill data is transmitted to external services for optimization.
scripts/improve_description.pyandscripts/run_loop.pysend the contents of the skill being developed, along with evaluation results, to the Anthropic API using theanthropicPython SDK. This is a primary function of the skill.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during the skill creation process.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads user-provided test cases from
evals.json, skill definitions fromSKILL.mdfiles, and qualitative feedback fromfeedback.json. - Boundary markers: Instructions use XML-style delimiters (e.g.,
<skill_content>,<new_description>) to isolate untrusted data within prompts sent to the optimization engine. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read and write files, execute local CLI commands, and perform network requests to the Anthropic API.
- Sanitization: The skill employs
html.escapein its reporting scripts and utilizes YAML block scalars in generated configurations to minimize formatting-based exploits.
Audit Metadata