canvas-design
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The Python scripts
create_cards.pyandinvestment_farming_cards.pycontain hardcoded absolute file paths (e.g.,/Users/chunjun/.claude/skills/...). This results in the exposure of the developer's local username and directory structure.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: TheSKILL.mdfile uses steering techniques to influence the agent's behavior, such as simulating past user interactions ("The user ALREADY said...") and mandating the repetition of specific high-craftsmanship terminology to enforce a specific persona.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Instructions inSKILL.mdexplicitly direct the agent to "Download and use whatever fonts are needed," which encourages the acquisition of third-party assets from unverified remote sources at runtime.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes user instructions without boundary markers or sanitization. - Ingestion points: User-provided inputs enter the context during the "Design Philosophy Creation" step in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill lacks delimiters or specific instructions to isolate user data from system commands.
- Capability inventory: File-write operations for
.md,.png, and.pdffiles, and script execution (create_cards.py,investment_farming_cards.py). - Sanitization: Absent; the agent is instructed to use the user's "subtle reference" as the core conceptual DNA of the work without filtering.
Audit Metadata