tavily

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill is designed to ingest untrusted data from arbitrary external websites via search, extraction, and crawling functions.
  • Ingestion points: The search, extract, crawl, and research endpoints retrieve and return raw web content (markdown/text) to the agent context (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions defined to prevent the agent from following malicious instructions embedded in the retrieved web content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is intended for "multi-step investigations," implying that the agent will make decisions or take further actions based on the retrieved untrusted data.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of external content is performed before it is processed by the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The tool provides curl command templates that use direct string interpolation for user-provided values like <query> and <urls>.
  • Evidence: In the search and extract tool mappings, variables are placed inside shell command strings. If the agent executing these commands does not properly escape shell metacharacters in the user-provided input, it could lead to arbitrary command execution on the host system.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (LOW): The skill makes network requests to api.tavily.com.
  • Evidence: All tool mappings use curl to send data and API keys to https://api.tavily.com. While this is the intended functionality, the domain is not on the pre-approved trusted list and represents a potential outbound path for sensitive environment variables like TAVILY_API_KEY.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 15, 2026, 09:00 PM