doc-coauthoring

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates fetching document content and context from well-known technology services and cloud platforms, including Google Drive, Slack, Microsoft Teams, and SharePoint, as described in Stage 1 of the SKILL.md file.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The workflow is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) due to its core function of processing untrusted external data within an agentic context. • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context through shared document links, file uploads, and content retrieved from messaging and storage integrations (Slack, Teams, Google Drive, SharePoint). • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit requirements for the use of boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested text. • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes capabilities for file creation (create_file), file modification (str_replace), and the invocation of sub-agents for testing purposes, which could be exploited if malicious instructions are processed. • Sanitization: There are no specific instructions for sanitizing, filtering, or validating the content retrieved from external integrations before it is used to influence the agent's drafting or testing behavior.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 12, 2026, 04:54 PM