template-engine
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data from CSV files and document templates, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in the input sources.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via
template_pathanddata_csvparameters in thefill_templateandmail_mergefunctions withinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or delimiters are defined to separate instructions from data during template rendering.
- Capability inventory: The skill has file system write capabilities (
doc.save,wb.save,Path.mkdir) and uses the Jinja2 engine for rendering content. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization for the data processed from CSV or template files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
docxtpllibrary and Jinja2 for template rendering (doc.render(data)). This represents a dynamic execution surface where Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) could occur if templates are sourced from untrusted users and the Jinja2 environment is not sandboxed.
Audit Metadata