code-review
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill takes the
target-branchargument and interpolates it directly into shell commands within theBashtool. A malicious branch name containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,; rm -rf /) could trigger arbitrary command execution. - Evidence:
git diff --name-status origin/<target_branch>...HEADinSKILL.md(Step 1 and Step 4 sub-agent logic). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill reads instructions from a file named
.review-agent.mdlocated within the repository being reviewed and injects its content directly into the sub-agent prompt without sanitization or boundary markers. This creates an indirect prompt injection surface where a repository owner can control the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points:
.review-agent.mdfile (Step 3 and Step 4 inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. The file content is placed directly above other instructions in the sub-agent prompt.
- Capability inventory:
Bash,Read,Glob,Grep, and theAgenttool for recursive task delegation. - Sanitization: None detected. The raw content of the external file is included in the prompt.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata