mcp-builder
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The file
scripts/connections.pyimplements astdiotransport mechanism via theMCPConnectionStdioclass. This allows for the execution of arbitrary system commands provided as thecommandargument. While necessary for MCP local server testing, it provides a direct execution vector. - REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): In
SKILL.md(Phase 3.2), the instructions suggest runningnpx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector. This command downloads and executes code from the npm registry at runtime, which is an unverifiable dependency pattern. - EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (LOW): The skill frequently uses
WebFetchto download documentation fromraw.githubusercontent.comandmodelcontextprotocol.io. These sources are not on the explicitly trusted list provided in the security skill configuration, creating a dependency on external, unvalidated content. - INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect injection. * Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdPhase 1.3 and 1.4 ingest data from external GitHub repositories usingWebFetch. * Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the agent to treat the fetched documentation as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions. * Capability inventory: The skill includes the ability to execute shell commands (viaconnections.py) and perform network operations. * Sanitization: Absent; the agent is expected to read and act upon the content of the external markdown files without validation.
Audit Metadata