baoyu-markdown-to-html
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 22, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The function
loadAndRegisterLanguageinscripts/md/utils/languages.tsdynamically imports JavaScript modules from an external CDN (https://cdn-doocs.oss-cn-shenzhen.aliyuncs.com). This allows for the execution of unverified remote code at runtime based on the language specified in markdown files. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill performs several network-based operations to external, non-whitelisted domains. This includes fetching SVG content from
www.plantuml.cominscripts/md/extensions/plantuml.tsand loading script grammars from a third-party Alibaba Cloud OSS bucket. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): Indirect Prompt Injection Surface Detection. 1. Ingestion points:
scripts/main.tsaccepts and processes arbitrary Markdown files. 2. Boundary markers: Absent; there are no delimiters or warnings to the agent regarding embedded instructions in the markdown. 3. Capability inventory: Includes networkfetchcalls and dynamicimport()execution. 4. Sanitization: Absent; the skill generates HTML output without applying a sanitizer like DOMPurify, allowing malicious scripts in the source markdown to persist in the output. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (LOW): The
SKILL.mdinstructions require the agent to executenpx -y bun, which involves downloading and executing the Bun runtime and local TypeScript files in a single step. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (LOW): The skill transmits the contents of PlantUML code blocks to
https://www.plantuml.com/plantumlto render diagrams. While functional, this sends potentially sensitive user markdown data to a third-party service.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata