opencli-autofix
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by processing untrusted data from external websites. Ingestion points: The skill reads
page.snapshotandpage.networkRequestsfrom adiagnostic.jsonfile generated by theopenclitool (Step 1). Boundary markers: The instructions lack delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded commands within the website content. Capability inventory: The skill hasEditpermissions to modify local files andBashpermissions to execute commands (Step 4 and 5). Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of the website content is performed before the AI uses it to decide on code patches. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a pattern of script generation and execution based on external input. It instructs the agent to analyze failure data from an external site, generate a patch for a TypeScript file at a path provided in the diagnostic data (
RepairContext.adapter.sourcePath), and then run the modified file usingopencli. This allows a malicious website to indirectly influence executable code on the local system. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell tools like
cat,sed, andopencliwith arguments derived from potentially untrusted tool output. Specifically, the path used incat <RepairContext.adapter.sourcePath>is not validated, which could lead to arbitrary file read or write if the diagnostic data is manipulated.
Audit Metadata