docxmakebetter

[Skill Scanner] Instruction directing agent to run/execute external content All findings: [CRITICAL] command_injection: Instruction directing agent to run/execute external content (CI011) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] BENIGN. The fragment presents a legitimate, well-scoped workflow for DOCX manipulation and analysis using documented OOXML practices and common tooling. There are no signs of credential harvesting, data exfiltration, or backdoors. Data flow remains within local file IO and established document processing utilities. Ensure external tooling is obtained from trusted sources to mitigate supply-chain risks in dependencies. LLM verification: This skill's stated purpose and the documented capabilities are consistent: the workflows (pandoc conversion, OOXML unpack/edit/pack, docx-js usage) are appropriate for .docx creation and tracked-change editing. The primary supply-chain and security concerns are operational rather than definitive malicious content: the skill instructs running unpack/pack scripts and (per static scanner) use of apt-get/npm/pip. Those actions expand the trust boundary because they fetch and execute third-party cod