find-commit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local git commands to retrieve repository history and commit metadata. \n
- Evidence: The helper script
scripts/search.pyusessubprocess.runwith argument lists forgit logandgit diff-tree. The manual fallback instructions inSKILL.mdalso suggest usingsubprocess.check_outputwith argument lists. \n - Security: By using lists instead of raw strings, the skill avoids shell injection vulnerabilities even when handling user-provided input like file paths or commit hashes. \n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides a surface for indirect prompt injection via malicious git commit messages. \n
- Ingestion points: Commit message bodies are ingested through
git login both the Python script and the manual fallback procedure. \n - Boundary markers: Content is extracted from HTML comments (
<!-- generation-metadata ... -->), but the resulting text is displayed to the agent without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands. \n - Capability inventory: The skill performs git read operations via
subprocessand provides context that influences the agent's subsequent decision-making and planning. \n - Sanitization: There is no sanitization or escaping of the
plan_contentsorunplanned_changesfields, allowing an attacker with commit access to inject instructions that the agent might interpret as legitimate plan requirements.
Audit Metadata