skills/jeremylongshore/claude-code-plugins-plus-skills/adobe-advanced-troubleshooting/Gen Agent Trust Hub
adobe-advanced-troubleshooting
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Technique 3 defines a diagnostic function that accepts a
statusUrlparameter and uses it as the target for afetchrequest containing theAuthorizationBearer token and thex-api-key. This enables an attacker to exfiltrate valid production credentials by supplying a malicious URL to the agent.- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Technique 2 instructs the agent to runcurl -vand capture the output infirefly-debug.log. This log file stores the plaintextAuthorizationheader and API key on the local file system. Additionally, Technique 5 prints the generated IMS access token directly to the console output, exposing it to the agent's context and any session logs.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires high-privilege access to network diagnostics and system tools, includingcurl,openssl, andtcpdump, which increases the potential impact of the identified credential exposure risks.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Technique 3 ingests data from external API responses and processes it without sanitization, creating an indirect prompt injection surface. - Ingestion points: The
statusUrlparameter and the resulting JSON response body from the fetch operation inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are used to separate external data from the agent's command logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes network access (
curl,fetch), file system writes (tee), and high-privilege shell access. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or escaping for data retrieved from external sources before it is processed or logged.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata