skills/jeremylongshore/claude-code-plugins-plus-skills/apollo-migration-deep-dive/Gen Agent Trust Hub
apollo-migration-deep-dive
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requests Bash permissions for kubectl and curl. The kubectl tool provides high-level administrative access to Kubernetes clusters, which could be misused to extract secrets, access environment configurations, or modify workloads.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The inclusion of Bash(curl:*) allows the agent to retrieve content from any external URL. This permission can be exploited to download and execute malicious scripts or payloads from untrusted sources.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Given the skill's purpose of handling sensitive contact and CRM records (names, emails, phones) and the availability of the curl tool, there is a potential vector for exfiltrating this data to unauthorized external endpoints.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external CRM systems (Ingestion points: scripts/migration-assessment.ts and src/migration/validation.ts). It lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious data within CRM records could influence the agent's behavior, leveraging its high-privilege tools (Capabilities: kubectl, curl, Write, Edit). No evidence of robust output sanitization for untrusted data was found.
Audit Metadata