skills/jeremylongshore/claude-code-plugins-plus-skills/building-gitops-workflows/Gen Agent Trust Hub
building-gitops-workflows
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE] (MEDIUM): The
Error Handlingsection inSKILL.mdexplicitly directs the configuration of sensitive credentials (SSH keys and access tokens) within{baseDir}/.git/config. Storing secrets in plaintext on the filesystem is a risk when the agent has broad file access. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (MEDIUM): The skill is granted
Read,Edit, andGlobpermissions. These tools can be used to access the{baseDir}/.git/configfile mentioned in the instructions, potentially allowing the agent to read and exfiltrate Git credentials or Kubernetes secrets stored in the workspace. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (LOW): The skill enables
Bashaccess restricted tokubectlandgitbinaries. While this is a good use of the least-privilege principle, these binaries are highly powerful and can be used to modify cluster states or push malicious code to repositories. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW):
- Ingestion points: The skill is designed to read and process manifests from external Git repositories.
- Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions for the agent to ignore or delimit instructions found within the fetched YAML manifests.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute
kubectlcommands andWrite/Editfiles. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not define a process for validating or sanitizing external configuration files before they are applied to the Kubernetes cluster.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (LOW): The
scripts/README.mdfile references several automation scripts (e.g.,argo_flux_install.sh) that are not included in the provided skill package. If the agent attempts to fetch these from an unverified external source at runtime, it creates a risk of unvetted code execution.
Audit Metadata