skills/jeremylongshore/claude-code-plugins-plus-skills/databricks-upgrade-migration/Gen Agent Trust Hub
databricks-upgrade-migration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (SQL injection) within its migration scripts. The Python functions in
scripts/migrate_to_unity_catalog.pyand the Delta Lake upgrade section interpolate table and catalog names directly into SQL strings using f-strings. If an attacker controls table names or schema names in the source environment, they could execute arbitrary SQL commands. - Ingestion points: Table names, schema names, and locations are ingested from the Databricks metastore using
spark.sql(f"SHOW TABLES IN {source_schema}")andDESCRIBE DETAILcommands. - Boundary markers: None present.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute arbitrary SQL via
spark.sql()and modify workspace infrastructure via thedatabricks.sdk.WorkspaceClient. - Sanitization: Absent. The code uses direct string formatting for SQL construction without identifier escaping or validation.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The migration runbook (
migrate_workspace.sh) includes a command to export production workspace directories to the local filesystem (/tmp/backup). This pattern moves potentially sensitive intellectual property and notebook content out of the managed Databricks security perimeter and into the local environment of the agent, representing a data exposure risk.
Audit Metadata