skills/jeremylongshore/claude-code-plugins-plus-skills/engineering-features-for-machine-learning/Gen Agent Trust Hub
engineering-features-for-machine-learning
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill configuration grants the agent permission to execute arbitrary shell commands via the Bash tool.
- Evidence: The
SKILL.mdfrontmatter includesBash(cmd:*)in theallowed-toolsfield, providing a broad execution surface. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection attacks because it processes untrusted external data files without sanitization or boundary markers.
- Ingestion points: The skill is designed to read and process user-provided datasets as seen in
assets/example_dataset.csvand thedata_pathparameter inassets/configuration_template.yaml. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to distinguish between data and potential embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including
Bash,Write, andEdit, which could be exploited if malicious instructions are processed. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is present to filter or escape content from input files before it influences agent behavior.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains deceptive metadata where the described functionality of a script does not match its actual implementation.
- Evidence:
scripts/README.mdand the docstring inscripts/feature_importance_analyzer.pyclaim the script analyzes feature importance using techniques like SHAP and permutation importance. However, the actual code is a generic filesystem scanner that reports on file sizes and types. This discrepancy could lead an agent to attempt analyses the tool cannot actually perform or misinterpret the tool's output.
Audit Metadata