exa-incident-runbook
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill uses
kubectl get secret exa-secrets -o jsonpath='{.data.api-key}' | base64 -dto extract and decode raw API keys. This practice exposes sensitive credentials to the agent's context during the triage process. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes high-privilege administrative commands that modify the cluster state, such as
kubectl applyfor creating secrets,kubectl set envfor changing deployment configurations, andkubectl rollout restartfor restarting services. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local script
./scripts/exa-debug-bundle.sh. Running external scripts whose contents are not defined within the main runbook allows for the execution of unverified logic. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes application logs via
kubectl logs, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if an attacker can influence log content. - Ingestion points: Reads logs from the
exa-integrationapplication pods inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None. The log output is piped directly to
grepandtailwithout delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands. - Capability inventory: The skill has access to administrative tools (
kubectl,curl) capable of modifying the environment and performing network requests. - Sanitization: There is no validation or escaping of the log data before it is presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata