skills/jeremylongshore/claude-code-plugins-plus-skills/ideogram-incident-runbook/Gen Agent Trust Hub
ideogram-incident-runbook
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
kubectlto modify the state of a production environment, including performing deployment rollouts, changing container environment variables, and updating generic secrets. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The instructions command the agent to retrieve and base64-decode sensitive API keys from the cluster environment (
kubectl get secret ideogram-secrets -o jsonpath='{.data.api-key}' | base64 -d), which exposes cleartext credentials in the agent's execution context and output. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references an external local script path
./scripts/ideogram-debug-bundle.shwhich is not included in the skill's file list, creating a dependency on unverified external code. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface through the ingestion of external data.
- Ingestion points: Data is read from the Ideogram status page via
curl, application health endpoints, Prometheus metrics, andkubectllog outputs from theideogram-integrationpod. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or explicit instructions used to prevent the agent from obeying instructions that might be embedded in the ingested logs or status data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has high-privilege capabilities including cluster management via
kubectl, network access viacurl, and arbitrary shell execution viaBashacross all scripts. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of the external data before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata