skills/jeremylongshore/claude-code-plugins-plus-skills/langchain-core-workflow-b/Gen Agent Trust Hub
langchain-core-workflow-b
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
calculatetool inSKILL.mduses theeval()function to evaluate mathematical expressions. This pattern allows for arbitrary Python code execution if an attacker can control the string passed to the tool, posing a risk of command execution within the agent's environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection through its agent configuration in
SKILL.md. - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters via the
{input}variable and external tool outputs likesearch_weborasync_search. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the
ChatPromptTemplateto isolate user input from system instructions. - Capability inventory: The agent has access to tools capable of dynamic execution (
eval()) and network operations (aiohttpinasync_search). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering of external content before it is interpolated into the agent's prompt.
Audit Metadata