posthog-incident-runbook
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the agent to retrieve and decode Kubernetes secrets, exposing sensitive API keys in plain text to the session output.
- Evidence:
kubectl get secret posthog-secrets -o jsonpath='{.data.api-key}' | base64 -din SKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill attempts to execute a shell script located at
./scripts/posthog-debug-bundle.shwhich is not provided as part of the skill definition, representing an unverifiable command execution risk. - Evidence:
./scripts/posthog-debug-bundle.shin SKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs high-privilege administrative actions on the production infrastructure, including modifying secrets, updating environment variables, and restarting deployments.
- Evidence:
kubectl apply,kubectl set env, andkubectl rollout restartcommands in SKILL.md. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted log data from production applications, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection if an attacker can control logged content.
- Ingestion points:
kubectl logs -l app=posthog-integration --since=5min SKILL.md - Boundary markers: Absent
- Capability inventory:
kubectl,curlacross SKILL.md - Sanitization: Absent
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata