skills/jeremylongshore/claude-code-plugins-plus-skills/tensorflow-savedmodel-creator/Gen Agent Trust Hub
tensorflow-savedmodel-creator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill is designed to ingest and process external content related to ML models and deployment patterns while possessing 'write' and 'execute' capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Triggers automatically on user requests or external data containing the phrase 'tensorflow savedmodel creator' (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: Absent; the skill provides no instructions to the agent to distinguish between its own logic and potentially malicious instructions embedded in ML configurations or code it is asked to process.
- Capability inventory: Requests 'Bash', 'Write', and 'Edit' tools, which allow for full system command execution and file modification (SKILL.md).
- Sanitization: None; no validation or escaping logic is defined for handling external data before it is passed to powerful tools like 'Bash'.
- [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill requests access to the 'Bash' tool. While potentially necessary for ML tasks (e.g., using 'tensorflowjs_converter'), the lack of specific script implementation to audit means the permission set is overly broad and lacks oversight.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata