tuning-hyperparameters
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requests
allowed-tools: Bash(cmd:*)inSKILL.md, granting the agent full shell access. This allows for unrestricted command execution on the host system, which is a significant capability that should be monitored for misuse.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's core workflow involves generating Python code using libraries like scikit-learn or Optuna and then executing it via the Bash tool. This dynamic code generation and execution process is functionally equivalent to executing arbitrary code at runtime.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its core logic of converting user-supplied requirements into executable code.\n - Ingestion points: User requests for specific models, datasets, and hyperparameter ranges as described in
SKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: No explicit markers or instructions are provided to the agent to distinguish between legitimate parameters and embedded malicious instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has broad tool access including
Bash(cmd:*)and the ability to write and run scripts across all provided scripts.\n - Sanitization: There are no documented steps or automated checks within the skill to validate or sanitize the input context before it is used to generate the Python code.
Audit Metadata