zai-cli
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requests broad
Bash(cmd:*)permissions to execute its primary functions via thezai-clitool, allowing for arbitrary command execution beyond the intended scope. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on
npxto fetch thezai-clipackage from the public NPM registry at runtime, which is an external dependency not managed within the skill itself. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Execution of
npx zai-cliinvolves downloading and running code from the NPM registry, representing a remote code execution vector. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from the web and external code repositories. Ingestion points: The
search,read, andreposubcommands fetch content from the live web and GitHub. Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to disregard instructions embedded within the fetched content. Capability inventory: The agent has access to full bash execution, file system modification (Write/Edit), and network requests (WebFetch). Sanitization: There is no evidence of input sanitization or content filtering before the data is processed by the AI.
Audit Metadata