coderabbit-prod-checklist
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
gh apicommand to modify repository branch protection rules inStep 5. Specifically, it updates themainbranch to requirecoderabbitaistatus checks and mandatory reviews. While this is the intended purpose for 'production readiness,' it is a high-privilege operation that modifies repository security configurations. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Shell scripts in
Step 3andStep 5use variable interpolation for$OWNERand$REPOwithingh apicalls. Without proper sanitization or escaping, this could be vulnerable to command injection if the repository or organization names are controlled by an attacker or contain malicious shell metacharacters. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its data processing workflows:
- Ingestion points: Reads the content of
.coderabbit.yamlinStep 2and fetches pull request/review metadata from the GitHub API inStep 3(relative file paths:SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present when processing these external inputs.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution via
Bash(gh:*),Bash(git:*), andGrep, as well as file reading capabilities. - Sanitization: While
Step 2usesyaml.safe_load()to mitigate standard YAML deserialization attacks, the shell variables interpolated inStep 3andStep 5lack sanitization.
Audit Metadata