baoyu-markdown-to-html
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- Remote Code Execution (MEDIUM): The file
scripts/md/utils/languages.tsdynamically imports JavaScript modules from an external CDN (https://cdn-doocs.oss-cn-shenzhen.aliyuncs.com) at runtime. - Evidence:
const module = await import(/* @vite-ignore */ grammarUrlFor(language))wheregrammarUrlForpoints to an Alibaba Cloud OSS bucket. This bypasses static analysis and allows the execution of arbitrary code if the CDN is compromised. - External Downloads (LOW): The skill fetches content from external services for rendering diagrams.
- Evidence:
scripts/md/extensions/plantuml.tsfetches SVG content fromhttps://www.plantuml.com/plantumlusing thefetchAPI. While the source is standard for PlantUML, fetching and injecting external SVG data into the output is a known vector for XSS if not properly sanitized. - Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The skill processes untrusted Markdown files which could contain malicious payloads targeting the rendering engine or the end-user's viewing environment (e.g., WeChat).
- Ingestion points: Input markdown file path provided as a CLI argument to
scripts/main.ts. - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill reads and processes the entire file content.
- Capability inventory: File system write access (
article.html), execution of TypeScript viabun, and network access for external resources. - Sanitization: Relies on the
markedlibrary for parsing. No explicit sanitization or stripping of dangerous HTML tags (like<script>) is visible in the provided logic.
Audit Metadata